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1
In Democracy and Disagreement, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson
offer a lucid brief for deliberative democracy, a hot topic in political and legal
theory today.' Deliberative democracy seeks to synthesize two great norms:
that laws should protect individuals' basic rights, and that citizens should rule
themselves.- The authors argue that to achieve both goals, democracy must
give moral reasoning a central place, and they elaborate substantive and
procedural principles for such reasoning. Gutmann and Thompson show how
citizens committed to these principles might quiet the discordant arguments
within American politics over issues like abortion and welfare policy.
Democracy and Disagreement covers vast terrain with great rigor, but its
program has costs and risks that the authors do not fully acknowledge.
Gutmann and Thompson would make American life more deliberative only by
excluding certain forms of life that now flourish. And they might do this
without better protecting basic rights; reflection on everyday politics suggests
that the security of liberal principles may sometimes require precisely the
inflexible commitments and polemical arguments that the authors condemn.
Gutmann and Thompson have little to say to such empirical concerns.
Although both authors have often applied the lessons of theory to practice 3
and again do so here, Democracy and Disagreement is, for all its merits,
political philosophy largely aloof from politics.
* Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Political Science. Princeton Unircrsity
** Alfred North Whitehead Professor of Political Philosophy, Harvard University
1. See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 296-302 (William Rehg trans. 1996)
(placing "deliberative process" at center of democracy): CASS R. SUNSTEIN. TIE PARTIAL CO\STII JtO\
133-45 (1993) (arguing that Constitution should be interpreted to safeguard "'deliberative democracy")
2. See HABERMAS, supra note 1. at 99-104: SUNSTEIN. supra note I. at 135
3. See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN. DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987); DENNIS F T}io%,POs, PoLmcAL
ETHICS AND PUBLIC OFFICE (1987).
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II
Gutmann and Thompson's deliberative democracy is best understood as an
intensification of one strand within John Rawls's political liberalism.'
Beginning with the fact of moral disagreement (p. 1),5 the authors aim to
develop a conception of democracy acceptable to "people who are mutually
motivated to find fair terms of social cooperation among political equals" (p.
26).6 Advancing this Rawlsian ideal of mutual justification amid diversity
further than Rawls himself, Gutmann and Thompson conceive more exacting
procedural restraints and less severe substantive limits than Rawls's own.
While accepting Rawls's view that a justifiable political process must
protect basic rights, the authors criticize Rawls for underestimating the role
that morally grounded argument-"deliberation"-must play in securing those
rights and in achieving a fair system of cooperation (pp. 34-39). Rawls's
"public reason," which specifies the moral and empirical constraints within
which citizens may fairly discuss constitutional essentials,' does not apply to
arguments concerning most social and economic arrangements.' Gutmann and
Thompson argue that Rawls's project therefore fails on its own terms, because
without public reason in debates on all subjects, rights and reciprocity will be
at the mercy of interest group politics (pp. 36, 146-47).
The authors similarly criticize Ronald Dworkin for suggesting that courts
can serve as a democracy's chief "forum of principle" (p. 45 & n.70).9 To
achieve justifiable results, Gutmann and Thompson say, legislatures must
deliberate for precisely the same reasons as courts; indeed, if most citizens
only haggle with one another, they cannot expect judges to do otherwise (p.
46). Thus, while the liberalism of Rawls or Dworkin cabins the demand for
reciprocal justification, deliberative democracy extends it to virtually all public
discussions'0 and institutions.
Gutmann and Thompson adduce three procedural principles of public
reason. "Reciprocity" requires that citizens argue in terms that are disinterested,
acceptable from different points of view, and empirically "consistent with
relatively reliable methods of inquiry" (pp. 55-59). "Publicity" suggests that
citizens and legislators act on reasons and information that are public (p. 95).
And "accountability" demands that legislators be able to justify their actions
4. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) (arguing that overlapping consensus of
different doctrines can sustain rights-based liberalism).
5. Cf id. at xvi (treating reasonable pluralism as "the serious problem" for political liberalism).
6. Cf. id. at 217 (expressing same idea).
7. See id. at 224.
8. See id. at 214-15.
9. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 70-71 (1985).
10. In ideal circumstances, the authors do allow purely prudential bargaining, but only if "legislators
and citizens properly consider the moral merits of the whole bargain" (p. 72).
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not only to their electoral constituents, but also to their "moral constituents,"
who include persons in other districts and nations (pp. 144-45).
In sustaining reasonable debate, citizens exhibit certain virtues. Expressing
moral positions consistently and not only expediently, they show "civic
integrity" (p. 81). Recognizing that reasonable citizens may reasonably
disagree, they eschew the "moral dogmatism" from which they might attack
their opponents' motives (p. 84). Finally, they are "open-minded," willing to
change their positions in response to new arguments (p. 83).
Alongside the three procedural principles, the authors present three
substantive values that resemble familiar liberal-egalitarian principles of justice.
"Basic liberty" protects the "physical and mental integrity of persons" (pp.
203-04). "Basic opportunity" guarantees that all citizens can secure a social
minimum (p. 217)." "Fair opportunity" requires that nonbasic goods, like
desirable jobs, be distributed based on qualification (p. 217).
Democracy and Disagreement sketches how citizens committed to the six
principles of deliberative democracy would reason together about controversial
problems. On issues like abortion (pp. 86-87), the authors recognize that moral
disagreements will persist even after deliberation, and they seek only to sustain
mutual respect among citizens. On other subjects, the authors maintain that
deliberation would lead to a specific outcome. In education, the state must
teach children how to exercise the public reason of a deliberative democracy,
even over parents' religious objections (pp. 63-69). On welfare, the authors
seek a middle ground, arguing that the state should require parents to work, but
only if it makes work available and guarantees child support, a living wage,
and adequate health and child care (pp. 291-300).
III
The liberal tradition from within which Gutmann and Thompson write
teaches that social diversity is a great good. 2 Rhetorically, the authors
embrace this value (pp. 25, 361).13 Substantively, their stringent procedures
would place a deep strain on common ways of life in at least two respects.
11. The authors reject Rawls's more exacting and egalitarian "difference principle." see R wt.s. supra
note 4, at 6-7, on the ground that it would strain limited resourees in ways that could not be justified to
reasonable citizens (pp. 211-16). The authors thus open up more space for democratic deliberation than
does Rawls-not because they treat majority rule as a greater intrinsic good, but because they claim to take
the ideal of mutual justification more seriously.
12. See William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism. 105 ETHics 516. 527 (1995) (describing how
liberalisms of Rawls, John Stuart Mill, and Isaiah Berlin cherish diversity).
13. The authors note that their relatively open-ended distributive principles legitimate more social
ideals than Rawlsian egalitarianism (p. 216). This may justify a bit more pluralism within the academy, but
it does not legitimate new social diversity. The nation is not now struggling to implement the difference
principle, and so the notion that the authors secure--that society need not organize itself to improve the
lives of the least advantaged--is one that the dominant politics already accepts.
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First, while the authors claim to welcome religious citizens to public life
(p. 92), the requirements of reciprocity would drive out of debate, and
sometimes eliminate entirely, certain religious perspectives that flourish today.
The authors' notion of reciprocity leaves little place in deliberation for the
expression of orthodox religious views. While reciprocity stresses justification
before others, openness to change, and mutually accessible empirical standards,
orthodox religiosity may require inflexible commitment to an external authority
or to faith achieved through revelation.' 4 To participate in deliberation, many
religious citizens would have to split their public and private selves (p. 93),
checking their personal beliefs at the door of the public forum. Many persons
of faith do not and would not do this.' 5 As the authors' prescription for state-
sponsored civic education makes clear, deliberative democracy seeks to put an
end to religious forms of life that do not produce citizens able and willing to
deliberate. This view places it at odds with other forms of liberalism, 6 any
number of Americans, and the U.S. Supreme Court.
17
Because of its commitment to universal justification (p. 361), deliberative
democracy also has no place for elected officials who simply "bring home the
bacon," or for the kinds of people who elect them to do so (pp. 146, 227).
While moderating such practices is surely desirable, it is hard to see how a
deliberative democracy could do away with them without also asking citizens
to commit themselves to much less diverse private lives. Most Americans
today are intensely dedicated to their families, their businesses, or their
communities. These partial commitments constitute the diversity of American
life, but they also limit the possibilities for public-spiritedness.' 8 People
caught up in their children's schooling or their choral group's singing likely
cannot expand their political horizons to weigh evenly the needs of people
across the nation, much less the globe. But citizens who became more engaged
in public life surely would not have as much time or inclination for those
myriad private pursuits. Here once more, a fuller commitment to deliberation
has costs for diversity.
Gutmann and Thompson argue that more of their brand of
deliberation-and, implicitly, less diversity-would better secure basic rights.
But this is just an assumption. Recent political experience suggests that rights
may sometimes receive support from the nondeliberative elements of our
culture that Gutmann and Thompson would silence. At a minimum, this
experience raises empirical questions to which the authors only presume answers.
14. See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 44 (1991).
15. Cf. id. at 173-287 (describing religiously rooted engagements in public life).
16. See Galston, supra note 12, at 524 (arguing that liberal society does not require critical reflection
by all citizens).
17. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that under Free Exercise Clause, state
could not require Amish parents to send their children to high school).
18. See I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 240-50,305-06 (199 1) (describing how
"private citizens" lead diverse lives but do not sustain ideal public policies).
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Consider welfare. Before 1996, America's welfare system did not require
or guarantee work and did not provide adequate health or child care to the
working poor.' 9 That system was inconsistent with the authors' "basic
opportunity" principle. The new welfare law 20 also violates that principle-
leaving many of the old problems in place, denying many families support, and
making few efforts to assure jobs to parents left without welfare. 2'
Would more deliberation have better secured basic opportunities? The
authors convincingly discredit a key argument for the new law-the claim that
welfare fosters dependency (pp. 286-88)-and seem to suggest that citizens
more committed to deliberation could have done the same. But most citizens
lack these two accomplished academicians' skills at sifting evidence. However
long our assemblies deliberate, they may just get it wrong. Perhaps this is what
happened with welfare, about which our leaders deliberated for years.2
Having embraced something like the deliberative ideal,23 President Clinton
himself carefully considered the minutiae of the welfare bill.-" It is hard to
imagine public officials deliberating more dutifully about public policy-or
reaching a result more clearly unacceptable from the authors' perspective.
Nondeliberative perspectives might have helped. Perhaps the strongest
advocates of Gutmann and Thompson's position on welfare over the last two
years have been religious leaders, particularly those from Catholic groups.
"
2
These leaders have often appealed to nondeliberative concepts like "Catholic
social teaching" as moral trumps. 26 It is plausible that more arguments of this
sort would have driven debate toward the authors' substantive principles.
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan suggests that public officials embrace welfare
reform out of undue confidence in public policy's capacity to improve
behavior.27 Against the rationalism that causes present harm to achieve future
19. See DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERT,mt NTIlE AIMERCAN FAmtlt' 232-35 1988)
(describing defects of old welfare regime).
20. Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Pub L No 104-193.
110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
21. See David T. Ellwood, Editorial, Welfare Reform ti Name OnI. N Y TI'%I.t. Jul) 22. 1996. at
A19.
22. See Ronald Brownstein, Welfare Debate Puts Blame for Povern Malan4 on Poor. L A Tm'.ts. Mar
24, 1995, at Al (summarizing decades-old debate over welfare policy).
23. See William J. Clinton, Remarks at Georgetown University. 32 WEEKL)" ComiP PRI:s. Doc 1190
(July 6. 1995) (encouraging national "conversation" that is "flexible" and committed to *'reason")
24. See Todd S. Purdum. Clinton Recalls His Promise. Weighs Historn, and Decides. N Y TIMES.
Aug. 1, 1996, at Al.
25. See Robert Scheer Editorial. Who is Left to Fight for the Poor'. LA TImES. Oct 31. 1995. at
B9; Elizabeth Shogren, Religious Groups Attack GOP Welfare. Medicaid Plans. L A TIMES. No% 9. 1995.
at A35.
26. See. e.g.. Filling the Gap. Can Private Insttutions Do It' Hearing Before the Subcomm- on
Children and Families. 104th Cong. 5-7 (1996) (statement of Rev. Fred Kammer. President. Catholic
Charities USA) (restating "Catholic social teaching" in arguing against welfare bill). Remberi G. Weakland.
Editorial, 'Wisconsin Works': Breaking a Covenant, WASH. POST. July 4. 1996. at A29 (describing
"Catholic social teaching" and concluding that welfare law is "'patently unjust"); see also Shogren. supra
note 25 (describing statement by interfaith group deplonng welfare bill as "unholy")
27. See 142 CONG. REc. S9329 (daily ed. Aug. 1. 1996) (statement of Sen Moynihanl
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gain, faith-based claims often reinforce norms of compassion. By welcoming
these perspectives rather than excluding them, democracy might secure fairer
results. We could not know for sure without engaging in a psychologically and
historically complex inquiry whose outcome the authors take for granted.28
Inflexibility and incivility may sometimes serve basic rights. The authors
criticize former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Joseph Califano
for stubbornly expressing his position on abortion (p. 84). But as an
administrator, not only a citizen, Califano could not have been more open-
minded without encouraging his opponents within the nation's vast health
bureaucracy to test his resolve and cripple his efforts. The decorous citizens
of a deliberative democracy would not charge that Republicans sent President
Clinton the welfare bill simply to curry favor with swing voters, or that he
signed it for the same reason. Yet the unmasking of hypocrisy might be
particularly important for protecting basic rights, to which leaders often
proclaim their commitment, and for the poor, who often lack access to the
facts to deliberate at Gutmann and Thompson's level. The triumph of kind talk
in politics could produce a debate loftier in tone but baser in content.
Finally, deliberative democracy's relentless universalism may disserve
individual rights if it asks more of people than they are able to give, alienating
rather than inspiring them. Arguably, the American welfare state has failed to
sustain citizens' loyalties in part because it has emphasized responsibilities to
a uniform but distant bureaucracy, slighting the strong but limited
commitments-to neighborhood organizations, for example-that can sustain
many services. 29 A theory always unsatisfied with partial perspectives will
likely lead to such unsustainable policies. A different approach would seek
only to foster what is best in citizens' partial perspectives and to harmonize
them for common ends. The authors simply presume that citizens will respond
to the universal discourse that deliberative democracy requires.
The commitment to deliberation that Gutmann and Thompson commend
to citizens also animates Democracy and Disagreement, and this makes it a
provocative book. Yet deliberation is not as complete an ideal for politics as
it is for political philosophy. The ideal is incomplete for individuals, who often
have goals at odds with deliberativeness. And deliberation may also be an
incomplete ideal for political discourse, which may depend on nondeliberative
values and rhetoric in order to serve individuals. Whatever our politics might
gain from heeding Democracy and Disagreement, it could lose much as well.
-Robert M. Gordon
28. Tocqueville famously argued that Americans' religious commitments sustain their liberty by
preventing citizens from embracing utopian and destructive social schemes. See I ALEXIS Ds TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERIcA 292 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans., HarperPerennial 1989) (1835).




A License to Steal: The Forfeiture of Property. By Leonard Levy.' Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. Pp. xi, 272. $29.95.
It is every legal scholar's worst nightmare. What could be worse than
writing a book advocating a certain viewpoint on a topic of current debate,
only to have the Supreme Court flatly reject your position in the months
following publication? This misfortune happened not once, but twice, to
Leonard Levy, author of A License to Steal: The Forfeiture of Property. Levy
argues that current forfeiture practices are both unfair and unconstitutional;
within the past year, however, the Supreme Court in both Bennis v. Michigan'
and United States v. Ursery2 upheld forfeiture in the face of constitutional
challenges. Although these decisions run counter to Levy's argument, they do
not render Levy's work irrelevant. Rather, they underscore the timeliness of
Levy's subject and its controversial nature.
Levy's central thesis is that "[l]aw enforcement agencies- federal, state,
and local-perpetrate astonishing outrages on owners of private property
through forfeitures," in large part because "forfeiture is a seductive source of
new revenue for law enforcement agencies" (pp. 1-2). While Levy's criticisms
of forfeiture are not altogether new, he provides a detailed history of forfeiture
and makes four interesting arguments against forfeiture: that the absurd origins
of forfeiture delegitimate its use today; that police officers abuse forfeiture in
practice; that many forfeiture laws tread upon the rights of innocent third
parties; and that forfeiture violates the Constitution. Levy's argument that
forfeiture is abused in practice is compelling, but his other arguments remain
unconvincing.
In A License to Steal, Levy attempts to explain both historical and modem
forfeiture and to describe the serious problems inherent in the practice.
Throughout his treatment of the forfeiture issue, Levy ambitiously discusses
both civil and criminal forfeiture.3 Levy devotes much of the book to an in-
* Andrew W. Mellon All-Claremont Professor Emeritus of Humanities. Claremont Graduate School
1. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (holding that innocent owner defense not constitutionall) mandated in cases
of civil forfeiture).
2. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996) (holding that civil forfeiture proceeding follo% ing criminal sentencing did
not violate Double Jeopardy Clause).
3. Criminal forfeiture can take place only after the owner has been conicted of a crime As Levy
describes it: "In a criminal forfeiture case the loss of property follos as a penalty imposed after the
conviction of the guilty party. The property need not have a relationship to the crime . " (p. 22) In
contrast, civil forfeiture employs the legal fiction that the government is actually bringing a case against
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depth examination of the history of forfeiture, starting with the Middle Ages.4
He explains that the legal fiction surrounding civil forfeiture originated with
the law of the deodand, which held that an inanimate object that caused a
death was tainted and therefore must be forfeited to the king (pp. 8-20). In
contrast, criminal forfeiture finds its roots in the king's practice of confiscating
the properties of felons and traitors (p. 24). After tracing the development of
forfeiture through several centuries, Levy concludes his historical exposition
with a section discussing the enactment of modern statutory forfeiture
practices.
Following this extensive exploration of the roots of forfeiture, Levy turns
his attention to modern practices, vigorously attacking current forfeiture
regimes. He argues that forfeiture is improperly implemented, ignores the
rights of innocent third parties, and is blatantly unconstitutional. Levy then
briefly discusses prospects for reform.5 He advocates abolishing civil
forfeiture, ending the practice of returning the proceeds of forfeiture to law
enforcement agencies, and implementing a universal innocent owner defense
(pp. 213-17), but he concludes that extensive forfeiture reform may occur only
in the distant future (p. 227).
While Levy's frontal attack on forfeiture is thought-provoking, it largely
fails because three of the four arguments that Levy invokes are flawed. First,
Levy uses his journey through history to demonstrate the senseless origins of
forfeiture. Implicit in this discussion is the absurdity of perpetuating a system
that attributed evil to an ox, a tree, a boat, and a broadsword (pp. 15-20). But
such an argument fails to address the subject on its own terms. The irrational
the object to be forfeited, not the owner. "[fln a civil forfeiture case the defendant property is somehow
connected to the crime regardless of the personal guilt or innocence of its owner" (p. 22).
4. Though perhaps more extended than most, Levy's historical discussion of forfeiture practices is not
particularly novel. For good discussions of the history of forfeiture, see Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
602, 611-18 (1993); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-86 (1974); Jacob
J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wronglid Death
and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169 (1973); Jimmy Gurule, Introduction: The
Ancient Roots of Modern Forfeiture Law, 21 J. LEGis. 155, 156-59 (1995); and Robert Lieske, Civil
Forfeiture Law: Replacing the Common Law with a Common Sense Application of the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 265, 270-80 (1995). Levy's discussion is
remarkable primarily for its detailed treatment of the legislative history of modem forfeiture statutes.
5. Levy explains that the Conyers Bill, The Asset Forfeiture Justice Act, H.R. 3347, 103d Cong.
(1994) (allowing forfeiture only following criminal conviction, removing financial incentives for law
enforcement, and protecting attorney's fees from forfeiture), would "in effect abolish[] civil forfeiture" (p.
213) and describes it as "ideal" (p. 217). He is forced, however, to conclude that it has virtually no chance
of passage. Levy also describes the more moderate Hyde Bill, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of
1993, H.R. 2417, 103d Cong. (1994) (shifting burden of proof to government, providing counsel for
indigents in civil forfeiture cases, and resolving discrepancies in innocent owner defense), but says that it
does not go far enough in reforming civil forfeiture (pp. 210-13). Finally, he considers the Department of
Justice proposal, The Forfeiture Act of 1994, quoted in 4 DOJ ALERT (No. 7) 13 (Apr. 18, 1994) (providing
for more onerous innocent owner defense and creating negative inference from assertion of privilege against
self-incrimination), a bill Levy considers unconstitutional in a multitude of ways, calling it a veritable
"prosecutor's wish list" (p. 225).
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origins of forfeiture have only limited relevance in assessing its merits and
legality today.
Levy's second antiforfeiture argument is that law enforcement agencies
abuse forfeiture practices to collect small fortunes in revenue. According to
Levy, "[P]olice become[] dominated by revenue enhancement that benefits
them, diverting them from law enforcement for its own sake. Law enforcement
becomes subordinated to making money for one's department" (p. 152). Under
the practice of equitable sharing, a community receives part of the value of
assets it helps seize, so long as that money is spent only on law enforcement
(p. 145). Levy claims that equitable sharing exacerbates the potential for abuse
at the local level (pp. 149-50). In support, he quotes several agency experts
who attest to the importance of equitable sharing (pp. 154-57), refers to a few
local police departments that have greatly benefited from forfeiture (pp.
136-37, 144), and cites statistics indicating that forfeiture receipts have
skyrocketed since the implementation of the program (pp. 151-52).6 Perhaps
the most compelling evidence offered by Levy is the fact that civil forfeiture
is vastly more common than its criminal counterpart. He writes: "[M]ore than
three-fourths of the victims of forfeiture are never charged with [a] crime. The
state wants their property, not their liberty" (p. x). 7
Although Levy's point about the potential for abuse by law enforcement
agencies is not new,8 he does succeed in dramatically emphasizing the
potential problem and effectively convincing the reader that some law
enforcement officers are motivated by improper considerations. By providing
primarily anecdotal evidence, 9 however, Levy fails to demonstrate the scope
of the problem, and readers are left with little sense of whether these problems
are isolated or endemic. Furthermore, he attributes the greater frequency of
civil forfeiture solely to an unseemly desire for profit but fails to address other
possible causes. Without denying the problem of prosecutorial abuse, others
6. For instance, Levy notes, "Forfeiture receipts have just about doubled every year from 1985. making
the share of state and local law enforcement agencies increase explosively" (p. 151)
7. Levy also points out that the practice of paying informants -as much as 25 percent of the value of
assets that are forfeited as a result of tips" (p. 141) leads to perverse and dangerous incentises
8. For other articles discussing the abuse of forfeiture by law enforcement officers. see Michael F
Alessio, From Exodus to Embarrassment: Civil Forfeiture Under the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act, 48 SMU L. REV. 429, 451-54 (1995); Carol M. Bast. The Plight of the Ainortv Motorist. 39 N Y L
SCH. L. REv. 49 (1994); Sarah Henry. The Thin Green Line. 14 CAL LAss 46 (Sept. 1994). and Joy
Chatman, Note, Losing the Battle. but Not the War: The Future Use of Civil Forfeiture bv Law
Enforcement Agencies After Austin v. United States. 38 ST. LouiS U LJ. 739. 745-49 (l994)
9. Levy argues against forfeiture by describing countless tales of (virtually) innocent people who have
had their cash (pp. 2-3), homes (p. 128). cars (pp. 128-29). and businesses (pp 4-5) taken by civil
forfeiture. Consider the case of Richard Apfelbaum. who was carrying 59460 on a gambling tnp to Las
Vegas. Drug Enforcement Administration agents decided that he %%as behaving suspiciously and asked him
to consent to a search. After the agents found Apfelbaum's cash. they confiscated it. and left him %ith
thirty dollars to get home. Apfelbaum contested the forfeiture, but eventually resigned himself to defeat.
saying, "'I'm not in a position to spend S10.000 in legal fees trying to get S9.000 back'" (p 131) These
stories have emotional appeal, but they do not substitute for substantive analysis. particularly given that
Levy rarely tells the government's side of the story.
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have attributed the prevalence of civil forfeiture to less nefarious motives.
Some scholars argue that the state initiates civil, rather than criminal, forfeiture
proceedings not because the government cannot convict these low-level
criminals, but because it desires to take the proceeds of criminal activity away
from the upper echelon bad guys-a goal that is radically easier under the
relaxed procedural standards of civil forfeiture.'0 Under this vision of
forfeiture, the goal is to take away ill-gotten gains, not put people in jail.
Levy's third antiforfeiture argument is that forfeiture, both criminal and
civil, fails "to provide adequately for the rights of innocent people" (p. 161).
One of the recent Supreme Court cases, Bennis v. Michigan," provides a
perfect example of the problem Levy (and others) 2 identify. The facts of
Bennis are simple: A husband and wife co-owned a car in which the
husband-without the wife's knowledge or consent-engaged in acts of gross
indecency with a prostitute.'3 Following his conviction, the State of Michigan
sued to have the car civilly forfeited under state law.14 Unlike most federal
forfeiture statutes, the state law provided no "innocent owner defense," and
thus allowed the wife to lose her interest in the car despite the fact that she did
not know or consent to its illegal use. 15 The Court upheld the statute, writing,
"[A] long and unbroken line of cases holds that an owner's interest in property
may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property is put even though
the owner did not know that it was to be put to such use."' 6 The Court held
that an innocent owner defense is not constitutionally required.
Levy argues that the difficulties innocent owners and interested third
parties face in regaining their property constitutes a potentially serious policy
problem inherent in current forfeiture practices. But he never acknowledges,
much less responds to, the arguments against implementing an innocent owner
defense. Several groups have argued that requiring owners to be strictly liable
for their property helps prevent illegal acts. 17 They note that "many statutes
10. See Peter W. Salsich, Note, A Delicate Balance: Making Criminal Forfeiture a Viable Law
Enforcement Tool and Satisfying Due Process After United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 39
ST. Louis U. L.J. 585, 593 (1995).
11. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
12. See, e.g., Sandra Guerra, Family Values?: The Family As an Innocent Victim of Civil Drug Asset
Forfeiture, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (1996); Jeri Poller, Government Forfeiture of Collateral: Mortgages
and the Innocent Lien Holder Defense, 112 BANKING LJ. 534, 536-40 (1995); Robert E. Blacher,
Comment, Clearing the Smoke from the Battlefield: Understanding Congressional Intent Regarding the
Innocent Owner Provision of 21 U.S.C. § 881(7), 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 502 (1994); George T.
Pappas, Comment, Civil Forfeiture and Drug Proceeds: The Need to Balance Societal Interests with the
Rights ofInnocent Owners, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 856 (1994).
13. See 116 S. Ct. at 996.
14. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.338b (West 1987).
15. See id. § 600.3815(2).
16. 116 S. Ct. at 998.
17. See Brief for Respondent, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729) [hereinafter
Brief for Respondent]; Brief of the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities ct al. as Amici Curiae




impose criminal penalties irrespective of any intent to violate them, the
purpose being to require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public
which shall render violation impossible."'" Another expert writes that the
effect of such a burden is that owners "must take a more active approach to
how [their] property is used, to protect the community and to preclude [their]
future exposure to forfeiture."' 9 Furthermore, strict liability is common-and
accepted-in other areas of the law.20 After all, if Mr. Bennis had driven the
car recklessly and harmed another without his wife's knowledge or consent,
she still would have been liable.2 1 Unfortunately, Levy never addresses these
issues, and instead implies that an innocent owner defense has no critics.
Levy's final antiforfeiture argument is that forfeiture is unconstitutional.
He argues that forfeiture violates the First Amendment (because nonobscene
books have been forfeited and destroyed) (pp. 177-83), the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement (pp. 185-86), the Fifth Amendment protection against
double jeopardy (pp. 186-90), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel (pp.
194-200), the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial (pp. 200-0 ), and the
Eighth Amendment protection from excessive fines (pp. 201-05). The Supreme
Court has agreed that civil forfeiture can be barred on a case-by-case basis by
the Eighth Amendment, 22 but has refused to recognize any of the other
constitutional arguments made by Levy. The value of Levy's review of these
constitutional issues lies not in its novelty,23 but in the way that it allows
even nonlegal readers to grapple with these difficult issues. By digesting the
Court's opinions and highlighting the key elements, Levy provides lay readers
with accessible versions of the Court's decisions.
The problem is that Levy provides only the bare outlines of the
constitutional debate on each issue and leaves the reader with the impression
that he has presented only half the story. Levy's discussion of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel (pp. 194-200) illustrates this weakness. The basic
18. People v. Roby, 18 N.W. 365, 366 (Mich. 1884), quoted in Brief for Respondent, supra note 17.
at 43-44.
19. Brief of American Alliance. supra note 17. at 7.
20. See, e.g., Worker's Disability Compensation Act of 1969. MICH. COMP. LAws AN. § 418101
to .171. For a good discussion of statutorily enacted liability without intent, see Morisee v. Unuted States.
342 U.S. 246 (1952).
21. See MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 257.401 (presuming knowledge and consent of owner when car
is driven by immediate family member). For a good discussion of this issue, sec Brief for Respondent.
supra note 17, at 45-47.
22. See Austin v. United States. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
23. Other scholars have made many of the same constitutional arguments. See. e g. Todd Barnet &
Ivan Fox, Trampling on the Sixth Amendment: The Continued Threat of Attorney Fee Forfeiture. 22 Otuio
N.U. L. REV. I (1995); Mary di Zerega, Austin v. United States: An Analyss of the Application of the
Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeitures, 2 GEO. MASON U. L REv. 127 (1994); Michele Jochner. The
Unjustified Expansion of the Double Jeopardv Doctrine to Civil Asset Forfeiture Proceedings. 84 ILL BJ.
70 (1996); Bruno Bier, Comment, RICO and the First Amendment: Alexander v. United States. 6 FORDHAMI
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 369 (1995); William Nelson. Comment. Should the Ranch Go Free
Because the Constable Blundered? Gaining Compliance with Search and Seizure Standards in the Age of
Asset Forfeiture, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1309 (1992).
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outline of the debate is as follows: Defendants have been prevented from using
forfeitable assets to pay attorneys' fees. Those who oppose forfeiture argue that
this is a violation of the Sixth Amendment because defendants may not
otherwise be able to afford to hire their counsel of choice. The Supreme Court
considered this issue in 1989 and concluded that there was no Sixth
Amendment violation.Y Levy criticizes this ruling, but ignores several factors.
For instance, he argues that public defenders (an indigent defendant's
alternative) are often inexperienced second-raters (p. 195). This does not,
however, constitute a Sixth Amendment violation. Furthermore, Levy-and the
Supreme Court-recognize that, under the present system, a lawyer who agrees
to defend a client whose only funds are subject to forfeiture will not be paid
unless he wins an acquittal. Levy argues that this puts the lawyer in the
untenable and unethical position of accepting a criminal defense case on a
contingency basis (p. 198). He does not mention that the Supreme Court
addressed this very problem. Justice White, writing for the majority, noted:
[T]here is no indication that petitioner, or any other firm, has actually
sought to charge a defendant on a contingency basis; rather the claim
is that a law firm's prospect of collecting its fee may turn on the
outcome at trial. This, however, may often be the case in criminal
defense work. Nor is it clear why permitting contingent fees in
criminal cases-if that is what the forfeiture statute does-violates a
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights?25
Levy ignores the Court's dicta on the issue. Instead, he latches onto the
Court's pivotal argument in the case-that defendants do not have the right to
enjoy the benefits of property that is not theirs (but rather the
government's)-and argues that this logic already convicts the defendant.
Levy's analysis fails, however, because assets are not forfeited in a criminal
context until after trial.26 Levy's treatment of the Sixth Amendment issue
illustrates the lack of depth that unfortunately plagues his examination of the
constitutional issues.
Levy's attack on forfeiture in the end succeeds only in part. Levy's
arguments about the problems of actually implementing forfeiture are
persuasive and suggest that it may be impossible to design a fair forfeiture
system. But the one-sidedness of Levy's other arguments renders them
unconvincing, and ultimately leaves one wondering how the proforfeiture camp
would respond.
-Leslie A. Hakala
24. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
25. Id. at 633 n.10.
26. For more on this issue, see Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation:
The Changing Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARv. L. REv. 670, 703-17 (1992).
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